In a shocking move, a judge today dismissed the case Donna Curling, et al. v. Brad Raffensperger, et al., claiming a lack of standing, even though the judge had previously ruled that standing was not a problem, and the judge had entertained many arguments on the merits of the case. GRA member David Oles has served as one of the attorneys on the case, representing Ricardo Davis from Cherokee County.
Key Facts:
• Case Background: The lawsuit, Donna Curling, et al. v. Brad Raffensperger, et al., was filed in 2017 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, challenging the constitutionality of Georgia’s electronic in-person voting system. It spanned seven years, including a 17-day bench trial in January 2024.
• Plaintiffs: Georgia voters (e.g., Donna Curling, Jeffrey Schoenberg) and the Coalition for Good Governance (CGG), a nonprofit focused on constitutional rights and government accountability.
• Defendants: Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger and members of the Georgia State Election Board, sued in their official capacities.
• Original System: The case initially targeted Georgia’s Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) system, used since 2002. In 2019, the court enjoined its use.
• New System: Georgia adopted the Dominion Ballot-Marking-Device (BMD) system in 2019, implemented in 2020, which uses touchscreen devices to produce paper ballots with QR codes for tabulation.
• Voting Process: Voters select options on a BMD touchscreen, review them on-screen, print a ballot with human-readable text and a QR code, and scan it. The QR code, unreadable by humans, is used for tabulation.
• Plaintiffs’ Claims: The BMD system violates voters’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights (due process, equal protection, and right to vote) due to unverifiable QR codes and a burdensome ballot review process. They sought to replace it with hand-marked paper ballots.
• Security Concerns: Expert Dr. Alex Halderman testified about BMD vulnerabilities, including potential QR code manipulation via malware, demonstrated through simulated attacks. A 2020 Coffee County breach also raised risks.
• Legislative Changes: Post-trial, Georgia enacted Senate Bill 189 (SB 189) and House Bill 974 (HB 974) in 2025, phasing out QR codes by July 1, 2026, and mandating use of human-readable text for tabulation, among other reforms.
Key Findings
• Standing Issue: The court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, finding that Plaintiffs lacked Article III standing due to no legally cognizable injury.
• Injury Claims: QR Code Verification: Plaintiffs argued the inability to verify QR codes harms their right to ensure votes are “counted as cast.” The court found this does not prevent voting, dilute votes, or stop votes from being counted, thus not implicating a protected right.
• Review Burden: Plaintiffs claimed the two-step ballot review (on-screen and printed text) is burdensome. The court found it challenging but not an obstacle to voting, lacking a basis in a cognizable legal right.
• CGG’s Standing: CGG claimed injury via diverted resources to oppose the BMD system. The court rejected this, as the underlying member injuries were not legally cognizable, despite evidence of resource diversion.
• Legal Precedent: The court cited cases like Spokeo v. Robins and Reynolds v. Sims, noting that injuries must invade a legally protected interest. Plaintiffs’ concerns were deemed policy objections, not judicially enforceable harms.
• Impact Acknowledged: Though dismissed, the court praised Plaintiffs’ efforts for raising valid security concerns, prompting legislative action (e.g., SB 189’s QR code elimination).
• Jurisdictional Limit: Without standing, the court could not rule on the merits of the constitutional claims, emphasizing federal courts’ limited role under Article III.
Outcome:
The case was dismissed on March 31, 2025, due to lack of standing, closing a seven-year legal battle.
Attorney Oles introduced extensive evidence of flaws and vulnerabilities in not just the ballot marking devices, but end to end from the voting booth to the results, and in the process presented an alternate view exposing the reasons why the Coffee County investigation was undertaken.
“We exposed that no one in the Secretary of State’s office was responsible for the security of the voting systems,” said Oles, “and were entirely reliant upon Dominion’s people. No audits, no testing, by state officials.”
“Rather than focus on ‘potential’ vulnerabilities, we produced evidence that ACTUAL errors and manipulations had occurred at the scanner and server and tabulation centers. It is indeed disappointing.”